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10.1 Introduction 
Private standards and certification schemes provide an increasingly signif-
icant site of study for scholars interested in the restructuring of the agri-
food sector. In the last ten years there has been a burgeoning literature 
on standards and certification schemes, focusing particularly on organic 
(Guthman, 2004), fair trade (Renard, 200S) and retailer-led schemes 
(Campbell et ai., 2006; Hatanaka et ai., 200S). The rise of private stand-
ards schemes has tended to be conceptualized as part of a broader global 
shift from public to private forms of governance as large international 
supermarket chains in particular, and to a lesser extent actors such as 
civil society organizations and social activists, exert increasing control 
over agri-food supply chains (Burch and Lawrence, 2007; Fulponi, 2006; 
Henson and Reardon, 2005) including the production practices of 
processors and producer-farmers (Hendrickson and James, 200S). This 
relates to the more general influence of what Cashore (2002, p. 504) 
terms 'Non-State Market-Driven' forms of governance that 'derive their 
policy-making authority not from the state, but from the manipulation 
of glulJdl IIldrkets dm.! attentiun tu customer preferences'. 
While this literature is significant in drawing attention to the shift-
ing power relations within agri-food supply chains from producers and 
processors to supermarkets, it gives little attention to how standards are 
implemented and adapted, and the role of state agencies, sub-state or 
regional authorities and producers m this process. Drawing upon insights 
from the literature on governmentality, this chapter examines the differ-
ent ways in which a privatf' standards ,,'hf'mf' - pnvironmentai manage-
ment systems (EMS), based on the international standard 15014001- has 
been implemented at a national, regional and industry level in Australian 
167 
168 Adapting Standards 
agriculture. We argue that the application of EMS has depended on alii · 
ances between a diverse range of agencies and actors - both public and 
private. Moreover, making EMS work at an industry and regional level 
has involved the adaptation of this standards scheme so that it accords 
with sectoral and loca l priorities rather than striving to meet the full 
requirements of the international 15014001 sta ndard. Prior to elaborat-
ing our argument, it is necessary to explore briefly the merits and limi ta-
tions of the existing literature on agri-food standards, and the ways in 
which a governmentalily perspective might assist in addressing existing 
gaps in knowledge. 
10.2 (Re)conceptualizing agri-food standards 
Political economy underpins much of the exist ing literature on private 
agri-food standards and certification systems. From this perspective the 
rise of private standards on a global scale is associated with three inter-
related trends. First, the creation of the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) 
has enabled greater global regulation of trade (Peine and McMichael, 
2005) and encouraged a free trade agenda as the assumed basis for world-
wide economic prosperi ty. Trade liberalization has also resulted in the 
further concentration of agri-food industries already under way at a global 
sca le (Morgan et aI. , 2006). Busch and Bain (2004) argue that the WTO 
has made possible a number of significant changes in agri-food govern-
ance. These include introducing 'a new set of international institutions 
and organisations to regulate trade'; making 'several existing but vol-
untary standards de (acto mandatory'; and opening ' the door for greater 
private regulation of the agri-food sector through standards, contracts, 
and agreements' (Busch and Ba in, 2004, p. 322). 
Second, a combination of trends in the agri-food system - intensification 
of agriculture, extension of supply chains, increasing distance between 
farmers and consumers and a series of food scares (Freidberg, 2004) -
have resulted in a loss of trust by consumers in the food supply system. 
In order to overcome consumer mistrust, new systems to manage supply 
have developed 'through new sets of intermediaries (such as certification 
bodies, dealers, transport firm s, distributors) that place stricter control 
on the particular quality of the product' (Morgan et aI., 2006, p. 67). 
Increasingly, emphasis is placed on the 'qualities' of food - rather than 
just the mass production of undifferentiated commodities. As many vol-
untary standards become de (acto mandatory, supermarkets are emerging 
as key gatekeepers (Lawrence and Burch, 2007), using private standards 
to compensate for inadequate public standards, to differentiate the 
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'qualities' of their products from competitors and to reduce costs and 
risks along supply chains (Fulponi, 2006; Hatanaka et aI. , 2005; Henson 
and Reardon, 200S; Kondal ct aI., 2007). 
Finally, the use of independent, or third-party, certifiers has become 
an important means for verifying standards in both conventional and 
alternative (e.g., o rganiC and fair trade) agri-food sectors. Third-party 
certification (TPC) has benefits for some producers, I for example provid-
ing a means for specialty producers to win the trust of consumers out-
side their Lmmediate locality (Re nting et aI., 2003). However, the scale 
and cost of changes required to conform to standards may, as Hatanaka 
et al. (2005, p. 361) note, ' result in some suppliers being squeezed out 
of business o r fo rced into alte rnative, less profitable markets'. TPC has 
been identified as an increasingly importa nt mechanism through which 
supermarkets consolidate their power, enabling retailers to exercise con-
tro l over all parts of the supply chain (Campbell et aI., 2006; lIa tanaka 
et aI. , 2005; Konefal et aI., 2007). 
A political economy approach is of clear analytical significance in 
drawing attention to the increasing power of large retailers - part icularly 
supermarkets - in regulating agri-food supply chains, and the structu ral 
changes at a global level that make this possible. In addition, it is use-
fu l in showing that standards and TPC are not simply objective and 
value-neutral mechanisms of governing. They are used and enforced, 
predominantly by supermarkets, 'as strategic business tools .. . to gain 
access to new markets, to coordinate their operations, to provide quality 
and safety assurance to their consumers, to complement their brands, 
or to define niche products and markets' (Hatanaka et aI., 2005, p. 356) . 
The strategic use of standards contributes to a shi ft in power li p the 
supply chain to retailers: those producers and food manufacturers or 
processors who do not have the resources to conform to standards are 
left without access to pote ntially lucrative markets. While we believe 
that political economy represents a powerful theoretical lens for the 
critical ana lys is of private standards and certification, it is limited in 
identifying the specific ways in which standards are implemented 
and adapted in practice. In general, the emergence of private standards 
and certification is examined as part of a linear historical narrative in 
which there is a wholesale shift of power from state agenCies to glo bal 
regulatory bodies (such as the WTO) and transnational retailers. The 
structural capacity of these actors to impose standardized practices 
throughout agr i-food supply chains is assumed to drive the shift from 
public to private forms of governance. We have two problems with this 
reasoning, 
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First, the displacement of one form of governing by another neglects 
the often complex ways in which programmes are implemented and 
rendered workable in practice (sec Higgins l 2001; OIMalley, 1996). What 
is particularly overlooked is the ongoing significance of state agencies 
in making private standards! and other market-oriented forms of gov-
erningl workable. As Buller and Morris (2004 1 p. 1079) argue, there exists 
a 'critical interplay and interrelationship of public policy and market 
forces in the setti ng of sustainability objectives. The market cannot act 
alone or in isolation.' While public agencies arc acknowledged in the 
agri-food standards literature as playing an ongoing role, little detail 
is given beyond claims that state capacities have been 'reorganized! to 
accord with the free trade ambitions of trunsnntionnl retailers ilnd glo-
bal governa nce agencies. We argue that it is important not to lose sight 
of how standards are made workable in the process of their implementa-
tion, and the often complex reasons for their adoption. 
Second, the standardization of technique (via standards and auditing) 
is treated as an unproblematic starting point in examining the impacts 
of standards on various actors in supply chains. Specific fractions of 
capital, such as retailers, are conceptualized as the main locus of power 
within modern agri-food production chains. Due to their structural 
power as creators and enforcers of standards, retailers are assumed to 
exercise increasing influence down the supply chain, with the practices 
of downstream actors harmonized and brought into line through stand-
ards and auditing technologies. Many existing explanations of agci-food 
standards are arguably based on such a conceptualization of restructur-
ing in which predominantly retailer-led private standards have the 
necessary momentum - through TPC - to transform food production 
by shifting power from producers to retailers. The producers who are 
responSible for implementing these standards in practice are viewed as 
having little or no capacity to alter or adapt them. Such vicws! accord-
ing to Barry (2001, p. 75), are flawed since 'a standard or regulation does 
not have any natural force or intrinsic momentum. It reqUires agents 
who arc prepared to make it into a reality' (emphasis in original). With 
specific reference to the agri-food sector, Campbell and Le Heron (2007, 
p. 135) argue that standards, as forms of governance! must 'be seen 
as varied, emerging in particular conditions, malleable in their func-
tionality, [and] accessible to use by different actors in differing ways'. 
On this baSiS, it is important to focus on how standards are made to 
work, and the diverse processes and actors through which this occurs. 
In order to examine the problems involved in achieving standardi-
zation, we draw upon an analytics of governmentality. This approach 
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has been used previously in agri-food studiesZ and it is not our inten-
tion to provide another outline in this chapter. We are interested here 
primarIly in one aspect of a governmenta1try perspective - technologies 
of governing - and its merits in addressing the limitations of political 
economy approaches. 
According to Rose (1999, p. 52), technologies of governing are mecha-
nisms 'imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of 
producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired events'. 
In this respect, standards are undoubtedly technologICal, given that their 
design and deployment are aimed squarely at shaping the conduct of a 
diverse range of actors so that they adopt a more uniform and desired set 
Of praCtices. Technologies include those: 
... humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to 
instantiate government: techniques of notation, computation and 
calculationi procedures of examination and assessment; the inven-
tion of devices such as surveys and presentational forms such as 
tables; the standardization ot systems tor tra ining and the inculcation 
of habits; the inauguration of professional specialisms and vocabular-
ies; building designs and architectural forms - the list is heterogene-
ous and in principle unlimited. 
(Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 183) 
While scholars tram a political economy perspective might view these 
mechanisms as enabling specific social groups to exercise power over 
others, and reflecting a broader historical logic, such as the logic of capi-
tal , this risks overlooking the otten complex ways in which particular 
technologies are assembled so that they are ca pable of regulating human 
conduct. As Rose (1999, p. 52) argues, technologies 'are never simply a 
realisation ot a programme, strategy or intention: whilst the will to gov-
ern traverses them, they are not simply realisations of any simple will '. 
Technologies - such as standards - represent a means for shaping 
human conduct by linking calculations in one location with action at 
another (Miller and Rose, 1990). However, the process of shaping human 
practices is fraught with difficulty. Drawing upon the work of Bruno 
Latour, Miller and Rose (1990, p. 11) note that attempts to govern 
action lat a distance' rarely achieve the outcomes envisaged by authori-
ties. This does not mean simply that the reality of governing constantly 
fails to meet some ideal regulatory state. Rather the failing nature of 
rule is a constitutive aspect of governing and the struggle to overcome 
problems and imperfections may, in fact, enable programmes 'to be 
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rendered both workable and durable' (Higgins, 2004, p. 472). In this 
respect, technologies can work in mul tiple and adaptable ways which 
do not necessarily accord with the objectives of anyone group of actors. 
Equally, the harmonization of technologies and human action is a con-
tingent achievement that needs to be investigated. 
The notion of technologies of governing has been applied as part of a 
broader governmental ity approach to study such issues as the construc-
tion of a national farmin g sector in Britain (Murdoch and Ward, 1997), 
the emergence of the entrepreneurial farmer in Australian agricu ltural 
policy (Higgins, 2002), and discourses of best practice in farming (Lockie, 
1998). However, apart from some work by Lamer and Le Heron (2004) 
on benchmarking in New Zealand agriculture. the technological aspects 
of govern mentality have not thus far been applied in a systematic way to 
private agri-food standards. 1n the remainder of the chapter we respond 
to this lacuna by exploring how EMS standards for agriculture have been 
assembled, and adapted, at a national and regional level in Australia. 
10.3 EMS as a technology of governing 
Australian agriculture was first exposed on a broad scale to EMS in 2002 
when the Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council. a group 
of State and Federal Ministers responsible for agriculture and natural 
resources, released the National Framework for EMS in Agrimlture (NRMMC, 
2002). Based on the IS0 14oo1 standard. EMS was aimed at providing 
farmers with a voluntary, flexible, and internationally compatible and 
credible tool for meeting 'current and future challenges, whether imposed 
hy government regulation, by consumer market preferences, or by com-
munities concerned about their local environment' (NRMMC, 2002, p. 7). 
Given the strong export-oriented focus of Australian agriculture, as well as 
the serious environmental problems associated with existing productivist 
approaches to farming, EMS at face value provides a useful means to sus-
tain natural resources and assure access to particular markets. This accords 
closely with Australia 's neoliberal position on trade in the WTO, and its 
opposition to farm subsidies in the United States and European Union 
(Dibden and Cocklin, 2009; Dibden et aI. , 2009). It also helps explain 
why EMS was chosen over other possible agri-environmental standards 
systems - such as those associated with organiC agriculture. No other 
standards or certification scheme meets the diverse demands of integrat-
ing environmentaL food quality, trade and farm management issues. 
EMS is a process-based standard which details 'the processes that a 
firm, or other organisation, may choose to follow for the purposes of 
Val/ghan Higgins, /acqui Dibrlen and Chris Cocklin 173 
managing environmen tal impacts' (Mech and Young, 2001, p. 8). Thus, 
EMS is based on a 'plan-do-act-review' process of continuous environ-
mental improvement. There are no baseline requirements for best practice 
apart from adherence to relevant environmental legislation, although 
EMS can be used, fo r example, as a way of building on existing industry 
codes of practice Of improving natuftJI rpSOUfr:e mtJntJgement pr.1 C'ti cP" 
at a ca tchment/ regional level. Consequently, the actual content of an 
EMS is largely dependent on the goals and priorities of individual land 
mtJnagpr.". This hpgs thp inpvitahlp l}IIP"Hon a .. to w hy ItJ nrlholrlf' f" might 
be interested in adopting an EMS. 
The EMS Framework (NRMMC, 2002, pp. 7-12) argues that there are 
thfPP main rlri vers for FMS .1doption by farmers: 
• Consumer demand for safe, ethically produced and environmentally 
friendly food . This is argued to contribu te to increased scrutiny of 
farming practi ces and the need for formal verification that food is 
produced in a safe and sustainable manner. EMS provides this verifi -
cation, hence ensuring access to markets where demand for 'green ' 
food is strong. 
• Retailer reqUirements for third-party certification covering food qual-
ity and safety, in response to g rowing co nsumer concern . The linking 
of EMS to the international standard 15014001 enables farmers to be 
prepared for the auditing practices associated with TPC. 
• Government environmental regulations and community concern over 
the health of natural resources. As the Australian Federal and State 
governments impose increasingly stringent regulations, and loca l 
communities exercise greater scrutiny over the impacts of fa rming, 
land holders wi ll be forced to demonstrate sound ecological practices 
to ensure ongoing access to particular resources. Having an EMS is 
viewed as a way of documenting managem ent practices, demonstrat-
ing a 'duty of care', and showing formally farmers' adherence to envi-
ronmental regulations. 
In order to test the applicability of EMS to Australian agriculture, the 
Federal government created three programmes: the National EMS Pilot 
Programme which funded 16 pro jects at both regional and industry 
levels (2003-6) at a total cost of AUS$8.7 million; Pathways to Industry 
EMS which assisted industries to develop and implement an EMS 
(AUS$11.9 millio n); and the EMS Incentives Programme, which e ncour-
aged adoption by individual farmers through grants of AUS$3,000. 
Following arguments common in the existing literature on agri-food 
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standards, these schemes might be interpreted as an attempt by the state 
to impose standa rdized means for farmers to align their practices with 
the requirements at transnational capital. However, given the flexibility 
of EMS as a process standard, as well as current lack of demand in both 
national and international markets for food produced using ISOI4001, 
this standard has in practice been lIsed to deal with a number of 
different issues, such as linking with regional natural resource manage· 
ment targets, providing for future staged integration with other systems! 
codes of practice and laying the toundations tor prospective upgrad-
ing to lS014001 certifi cation. Thus, while state agencies may wish to 
encourage the adoption of certified EMS as a mechanism for integrating 
farmers' agri-environmental practices with the logic ot 'the market', in 
practice this technology of governing has been harnessed to a diversity 
of purposes and made to 'work' in a variety of ways. In the following 
section of the paper we examine an industry-based case study, in which 
EMS was adapted in the course of its implementatioo . The case study 
uses qualitative methods drawing upon interviews with two dairy indus-
try representatives, collected as part of a broader study by the authors 
on market instruments fo r environmental management in Australian 
dairying, as well as material from rural newspapers, government and 
dairy industry reports, websites, newsletters and 'grey literature'. 
10.4 Adapting EMS - the Australian dairy industry 
The implementation of EMS through the National Pilot Programme showed 
that this technology of governing could be potentially reworked to 
conform to a range of regional, industry and farmer goals. In the case 
of the Australian dairy industry, EMS provided a potential means to 
ameliorate adverse environmental impacts and associated reputational 
problems arising from intensive dairy farming. These problems had been 
anticipated in 2000 in the lead up to the deregulation of the dairy 
industry, which removed price supports for dairy farming, resu lting in 
more intensive production (Dibden and Cocklin, ZUU5) . The experience 
of New Zealand, which had adopted neoliberal, free trade policies even 
earlier than Australia, was instructive: severe environmental problems 
had become increasingly apparent since deregulation ot the dairy indus-
try in the mid-1980s (Jay, 2007). 
Despite the relatively low priority given to environmental practices 
compared to tood satety (fulponi, ZUU6; MorriS, ZUUU), and the lack of 
evidence of demand by retailers (Morgan et aI., 2006), both government 
agencies and the dairy industry in Australia have recognized for some 
time that they may eventually be called to account tor the adverse 
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impacts of intensive dairy farming. While dairying in Austra lia has thus 
far escaped the 'dirty dairy' tag applied by fishing and environmental 
groups ill New Zedlanu OilY, 2007), lllt:n:: i::. lIullelllele!)!) an aWdlelle!)::i 
that the Idean and green' image of Australian food production must 
be supported by improved natural resource management (Chang and 
Kri.sliall!)ell, 2004; LawrellLe, 2005). Tile::ie LUIILenL::i iifU!)e at d dairy ilH..lu!)-
try level in the lead-up to deregulation in 2000, which was predicted -
accurately - to result in a growth in the scale and intensity of production 
aLLUl II IJiillieu oy im.: rea::ieU U::ie uf inputs, notalJly wiiter, feeu iillU fer-
tilizers, and problems dealing with expanded effluent discharges into 
waterways. To deal with these issues, a project (Dairying for Tomorrow) 
wa::i fumleLl UlH.ler rlie Nationa l Landcare Programme anLl later through 
Federal government grants to promote EMS to the farmer-suppliers of 
milk processors (Dibden and Cocklin, 2005). The way that EMS has 
been adopted and modtfled by DairyIng for Tomorrow and processors 
provides an interesting study in how EMS has been adapted to meet 
industry needs. Our focus is on the Gippsland region of south·eastern 
ViCtoria, where EMS-eype Initiatives have been most fully developed. 
Soon after deregulation in 2000, a 'Dairy Self·Assessment Tool' (DairySAT) 
was developed at the instigation of a Gippsland dairy farmer. At that time, 
the Image of dairy farming had been tarnished by a toxic algal bloom 
outbreak, largely attributed to pollution from dairy farm effluent, in the 
scenic and environmentally important Gippsland Lakes. This inspired 
the Idea of findIng a means to demonstrate farmers' envlronmental cre-
dentials. According to the farmer who originally developed Da irySAT, 
though most people in agriculture do the right thing, nor many peo· 
pie know that, or not many people are aware of that. You only hear 
of the bad examples that are highlighted in the press or taken to court 
or whatever. 
(Interview, 2007) 
At the same time, a project initiated by a group of GippSland beef pro-
ducers (Higgins et aI., 2008) suggested a way for dairy farmers to demon-
strate environmentally responsible behaviour through third· party EMS 
certification consistent with 1501400 1. However, the farmer who devel-
oped DairySAT also saw the problems experienced by the Gippsland 
group in the ea rly stages of developing a beef EMS. 
1 saw farme.rs' wives crying because it was so stressful on the day 
of audits, and ... look, work was pulled apart and so on and these 
were people that were very good record keepers and very, very good 
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environmental managers and I thought, wow, if they're having trou· 
ble with it, I can certainly see that the dairy farming community will 
totally dig their heels in . . .. I didn't want to see us going down that path 
in the dairy industry because I thought it would be a disaster . ... So it 
was more or less, let's think up a programme that every farmer ... can 
read through at thcir leisure or their tinting and benchmark themselves 
against what is an accepted standard. 
(Interview, 2007) 
This idea was taken to the regional dairy extension organization 
(GippsDairy) , gained support from other catchment and state govern· 
ment agencies in Gipps land and was developed together with a group of 
farmers who 'rated the project as an opportunity to be proactive, rather 
than being subjected to a "big stick" over environmental issues' (Dff, 
2003, n o page numbers). The outcome was a simple self assessment tool 
for dairy farmers to use on farm. The fact that DairySAT is a farmer· 
initiated idea has been widely used to promote the tool to dairy farm· 
ers, da iry industry organizations and government bodies. After initial 
development by GippsDairy and the Victorian Department of Primary 
Industries, ' and 'road testing' by 74 Gippsland dairy farmers, DairySAT 
was endorsed by Dairying for Tomorrow (DIT) 'as the single national 
platform for the dairy industry to address environmental issues l , and 
Federal government funding was received for an 'EMS Pilot Dairy Pro· 
ject committed to using DairySAT as the first point in developing its 
EMS' (Neilson, 2003, no page numbers). 
Federal funding for DfT enabled DairySAT to be tested and promoted 
at a regional level through a network of Natural Resource Management 
(NRM) coordinators appointed in each of eight dairying regions of 
Australia. In Gippsland, DairySAT was largely promoted through envi· 
ronmentally oriented land care groups4 or Environmental Best Manage 
ment Practice training programmes. It thus sat squarely within the 
area of government attempts to build NRM partnerships between farm 
and rural groups and government agencies, including quaSi-government 
regional NRM or catchment bodies. Increasingly, the projects and under· 
lying philosophy of DfT actively encourage collaborative partnerships 
between the dairy industry and catchment managers to set on farm tar-
gets for change that will contribute to healthy catchments and commu· 
nities. For example, according to a dairy regional project officer, a recent 
Off progr3mme in Gippsland Targets for Ch3nge has explicitly sought 
to address 'high priority hot spots' identified by West Gippsland Catch· 
ment Management Authority (Interview, 2008) . 
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From the early days of development of DairySAT it was accepted 
that few farmers were li kely to adopt this tool without the offer of 
incentives. The origi nal group of fa rmers who helped to pilot DairySAT 
were enticed by 'a very nice carrot ... that if they helped review the 
Da irySAT and went through it, then they'd get a whole farm nutrient plan 
done' (In terview, 2008) . Similarly the role of DfT regional co-ordinators 
included providing 'assistance in obtaini ng in centi ves and grants' 
(interview, 2008). In general , DairySAT has been incorporated within 
projects to encourage sustainable farm ing combini ng environmental 
improvemen ts with production benefits. The major emphasis has been 
on appropriate use and disposa l of fertilizers and effluent rath er than 
improvements with less obvious production links, such as tree planting 
or biodiversity conservation. However, DairySAT projects have endeav-
oured to show that most environmental best management practices 
have productivity gains linked to them, such as improved milk produc-
tion where trees provide shade and shelter, or fencing off watercourses 
which protects water quali ty and preven ts injury to cows from fa lling 
down stream banks. 
DairySAT consists of a kit which can be used in training courses and 
also worked through by farmers in their own time. In this way, it is a 
technological means by which farmers can self-monitor and thereby gov-
ern their agri-environmental conduct in a 'responsible' way (Rose, 1999). 
It not only provides checklists for farmers to assess their own environ-
mental performance, but also bri ngs together useful information about 
legislative requirements and sources of advice and support. Nevertheless, 
despite the encouragement offered to farmers, DairySAT has to date only 
been adopted by approximately 20 per cent of Australian dairy farmers. 
It has increasingly been recogn ized that adoption by dairy farmers is 
unlikely to progress far without backing from the dairy companies, 
which are potentially in a strong position to influence their suppliers. 
A new DairySAT manager appOinted with Federal funding in 2006 is 
required to spend SO per cent of her time promoting the instrument 
to dairy companies. However, the response by most dairy companies 
has been decidedly lukewarm. There is reluctance on the part of these 
companies to impose burdens on already financially stressed and increas-
ingly footloose farmers. Farmers have shown a preparedness to leave the 
industry or change processors if hard pressed. At the time of deregu la-
tion, the increased cost of meeting new hygiene standards, combined 
with lower prices, resulted in a steep reduction in dairy farmer numbers 
and eventually also in competition between processors to attract fa rmer-
suppliers (Dibden and Cocklin, 2007). More recently, Warrnambool 
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Cheese and Butter Company lost a third of its milk supply within a mat-
ter of days when payments to suppliers were reduced abruptly (Smith, 
2009). 
In addition to the difficulty in ensuring adoption, DairySAT has been 
criticized for its inability to provide accurate measures of environmen-
tal performance. In theory, information provided by farmers about 
their own environmental actions can be used to establish the extent 
to which land managers are meeting resource condition targets set by 
quasi governmental reg ionat catchment authorities. But in practice, the 
subjective nature of DairySAT self-assessments makes this difficult to 
achieve. As the farmer who originally developed DairySAT notes, 'the 
DairySAT has a check list within it or a programme to follow and if 
you don't come up to scratch , it's purely up to your conscience to decide 
if you wish to do something about it' (Interview, 2007). There has been 
a reluctance to adopt IS01100 1 within the dairy industry both because 
there is currently no clear market benefit to be gained and because dairy 
farmers are perceived to be too stressed as a result of problems ranging 
from severe drought to low prices on global markets . Since DairySAT 
records are not audited, there is nO third-party ensuring that standards 
are maintained. However, even an EMS with a full third-party audit 'has 
som e serious shortcomi ngs', particularly the fact that 'IS014001 is a 
process-based standard which does not guarantee environmental per-
formance outcomes' (Gunningham, 2007, p. 304). 
Apart from some interest by small dairy companies supply ing niche 
markets, only one major processor has made a serious commitment 
to introducing auditable environmental standards. Murray Goulburn 
Co-operative (MGC), which processes over a th.ird of Australia's milk 
supply, is a major exporter of dairy products and hence particularly 
attuned to present and future demands from overseas consumers for 
'environmental susta inability in its business from "cow to customer'" 
(MGC, 2008, p. 3). As the only remaining major dairy co-operative, 
MGC is obliged to compete with other processing companies for a dwin-
dling pool of suppliers by providing needed services and anticipating 
regulatory changes which may affect the viabil ity of the co-operative 
and its members. In 2007 (and again in 2008), MGC obtained a Federal 
government grantS to 'pilot supply-chain driven engagement of dairy 
farmers in improved environmental performance and reporting via 
milk company field officers and supplier intranet', bringing 'together 
dairy processor/supplier relationship, service providers and catchment 
planners to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach for wider applica-
tion across the Australian dairy industry' (NLP, 2007). DairySAT would 
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be incorporated into the exist ing intranet information management sys-
tem (MGF@RM), which currently integrates milk production and finan-
cial information. 
The incorporation of DairySAT into a web-based reporting system 
marks a significant movement beyond self-assessment towards a poten-
tially auditable system. Indeed, West Gippsland Catchment Management 
Authority, which worked closely with MGC in establishing information 
relevant to catchment health to be reported by farmers, was described as 
'acting as the auditing authority' for the pilot project (MGC, n.d., p. 2). 
The initial motivation for the MGF@RM en hancement appears to have 
been the desire to pre-empt possible future environmental regulation 
and meet anticipated customer requirements. However, increasingly MGC 
has become concerned to find a way to link MGF@RM to emissions trad-
ing as part of a broader approach of shielding dairying (and farmers) 
from anticipated risks. The very real threat posed by emissions trading 
was expressed in Murray Goulburn's response to the federal govern-
ment's proposed emissions trading scheme. An MGC executive claimed 
that the increased cost of the energy used in dairy processing meant 
that, even without a charge for emissions from farms, dairy farmers 
supplying the co-operative would lose an estimated AUS$5-$10,000 a 
year. These losses would be exacerbated by the 'major trade imbalances 
arising from the scheme', and the different emissions trading rules in 
other countries, creating an 'unlevel playing field' for Australian pro-
ducers (Cawood, 2009, pp. 1-2). As the executive observed, 
Because most of the products MGC produces are freely imported 
from other countries, or exported into other hotly-contested markets, 
passing on emissions cost to consumers would be bUSiness su icide . ... 
All we can do is reduce the price we pay our farmers. 
(Cawood, 2009, pp. 1-2) 
[n an effort to forestall these adverse impacts, MGC has recently obtained 
fund ing" to update MGF@RM to incorporate a range of tools to meas-
ure nutrient loss, nitrogen utilization, energy use and the effects of 
greenhouse gas abatement strategies. The system will be set up in such 
a way that farmers can feed in in formation from third-party vendors, 
such as energy bills, automatically upload data relating to emissions 
into the accounting tools and transmit these data to MGC. The project 
aims to enable farmers to account for emissions with minimal disrup-
tion to their farm businesses. At the same time, one-an-one support 
will be provided to assist farmers to implement best management 
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practices which reduce and mitigate emissions without (ideally) losing 
productivity. 
10.5 Conclusions 
This chapter contributes to the li teratu re on agri~food standards in 
two key ways. First, it illustrates how standards may be adapted in 
the cou rse of their implementation . Drawing upon a govern mentali ty 
approach. which conceptua lizes stan dards as 'technologies of govern· 
ing', we demonstrate that standards indeed aim to align the practices of 
different actors in particular ways. However, in practice, the process of 
making standards work involves a range of agencies. This may contrib~ 
ute to the original aims of standards schemes being compromised from 
the outset, yet also make these schemes workable for those involved 
in their implementation. For instance. EMS in th e Australian dairy 
industry has been partially adopted, and adapted, through a hybrid mix 
of public and private initiatives, which intermingle Federal, state and 
industry funding, with support from agricultural commodity organiza~ 
tions, agri-food processors, regional governance bodies and farmers. In 
recognition that insufficient market demand exists for a fully certified 
EMS, DairySAT was developed as a way to assist farmers with managing 
risk, and as a tool for helping to demonstrate farmers' environmental 
creden tials. Thus, our research supports Rose's (1999, p. 52) argument 
that tech nologies of governing are 'imbued with aspirations for the 
shaping of conduct in the /lope of producing certain desired effects and 
averting certain undesired events' (emphasis added). They are not mech~ 
anisms which are able to guarantee particular outcomes. This contrasts 
with political economy analyses which typically view standards as a pre-
constituted technical means by which powerful actors are able to stand~ 
ardize and harmonize the practices of those downstream within food 
supply chains. 
Second, we show that private standards are not necessarily driven 
always by the interests of retailers, or other seemingly powerful actors. As 
Rose and Miller (1992, p. 184) note, ''' power'' is the olltcome of the affilia-
tion of persons, spaces, communications and inscriptions into a durable 
form' (our emphasis). Hence. it is important to examine how technolo~ 
gies, such as standards, are constituted as objects of knowledge, and who 
has the capacity to exert 'agency' or 'power'. While EMS is promoted by 
the Federal government as a way of meeting consumer, community and 
retailer reqUirements for 'clean and green' food, the introduction of EMS 
in the Australian dairy industry has been farmer-initiated . The main 
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rationale was to take a proactive approach to environmental issues and 
thereby avert more onerous intervention by governments. However, in 
order to meet the needs of farmers already snessed by falling commOd-
ity prices and drought, EMS was adapted through collaboration between 
public and private agencies as an environmental self-assessment tool 
(Da irySAT). Ir is nmcwonl1Y [har dairy processing companies have In 
genera l shown little interest in DairySAT and other technologies of 
environmental assurance. This contrasts with the strong focus by these 
compaJ1les on food safety and quality standards, wl1ich are essential tor 
dairy companies to remain in business. The predominant focu s on food 
safety and quality in the dairy industry, as well as the lack of market 
benefits from pursulI1g non-organic environmental standards, has argu-
ably hampered widespread adoption of DairySAT, and interest in EMS 
more broadly. 
At farm level, Morns (2UOU, p. 444) argues t11at positive environmen tal 
improvements beyond those normally expected of farmers are on ly Jikely 
to be achieved 'if farmers are directly rewarded' for them and if payment is 
'targeted on specHied environmental outcomes'. In terms ot processing 
compan ies, research on EMS indicates 'that enterprises are only likely 
to commit substa ntial resources to such systems, rather than making 
tokenistic eHorts to comply, where they perceive a strong economic self-
interest in doing so, and most commonly they do not' (Gunningham, 
2007, p. 304). This suggests two possible ways forward for adoption of 
EM~ or other private environmental standards in Australia: either govern-
ments must contribute sufficient resources to overcome this reluctance 
or enterprises must be subjected to strong public or private regulatory 
reqUirements, with substantial penalties tor non-compliance. However, 
at present, there is on ly limited pressure for demonstrating responsible 
environmental performance from overseas markets, governments and 
consumers. Instead, it is the proposed creation ot a national market for 
emissions trading that appears to be driving a shift towards aud itable 
environmental standards. 
Notes 
1. See for instance the case study of the New Zealand kiwifruit industry in 
Campbell et aJ. (2006) . 
2. For a useful outline of the agri-food Uterature drawing upon a governmental-
ity ;appro;arh, <;PP I-ligg;m (200?.) ;ann I.orkip ;ann Higgim (Z007) 
3. Support was also received from the Victorian Environment Protection Agency, 
wh ich is responsible for regulating pollution from dairy farms - and prosecut-
ing farmers where necessary. 
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4. Land care groups are a key vehicle of natural resource management in Austra lia 
and have been embraced by governments, farmer organizations and conserva· 
tion groups 'as offering a model fo r effective community action to manage 
land degradation and assist the move to more susta inable resource use' (Curtis 
and De Lacy, 1996, p. 120). These groups are volunta ry, rece ive limited govern· 
ment funding, are open to any member of the local community and tend to 
operate at a catchmen t o r regional sca le. Activ it ies pursued by land' care grou ps 
include the identification of resource management priorities, deve lopment of 
action strategies, conducting of fie ld days and farm walks and a range of edu· 
cational and promotional work (Curtis and De Lacy, 1996, p. 121). 
5. A National Landcare Program (N U') Na tural Kesource Innovat ion Grant 01 
S123,OOO was awarded for 2006/07, and a Caring for our Country·Landcare 
Sustainable Practices Grant o f S98,000 for 2008/09. 
h. MGC. wa<i awarded a FarmReady Industry Grant of $150.000 in May 2009 
for 'Tools for Dairying Change - The implementation of an on-farm cUmate 
change adaptation and greenhouse gas emiss ions mitigation support model 
for Australian Dairy Farms'. 
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